This paper proposes an identification method of anomalous traffic such as DDoS attacks. Identification results are represented as a set of aggregated flows; such as source/destination IP address ranges(prefixes), source/destination port numbers and protocols and can be used as ACL (Access Control List) rules at routers. We set requirements for the identification can be summarized as the following three conditions; 1) covering the anomalous traffic, 2) avoiding to cover normal traffic, 3) with small number of aggregated flows. To accomplish these requirements, we propose a method to generate a set of aggregate flow that achieves the highest score representing the requirements by comparing before and after attacks and searching a optimal set with dynamic programming to avoid exponential computation explosion.
Introduction
With threats against Internet security increasing, protecting network and/or server resources from anomalous traffic, such as DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, has become a critical task in network operations. We have mature technologies on detecting anomalous traffic by statistical traffic analysis [1] . However, only detecting anomaly is not enough. To take an action for the detected anomaly, it should be identified; such as source/destination IP address ranges(prefixes), source/destination port numbers and protocols. Once anomaly is identified, then we can mitigate the anomaly such as configuring ACL (Access Control Lists) to block or rate-limit the anomaly at routers. This paper proposes a method for anomaly identification. From the view point of identification, requirements for the identification can be summarized as the following three conditions; 1) covering the anomalous traffic (maximizing the filter coverage), 2) avoiding to cover the normal traffic (minimizing collateral filtering), 3) with small number of flows (minimizing the number of ACLs and avoiding overfit).
However, there are conflicts among the above three requirements. For example, if we specify DDoS traffic by its destination (victim) addresses, we can satisfy conditions 1) and 3), but it leads collateral filtering for normal user accesses to the victim and condition 2) is not satisfied. Thus we should also identify the source IP addresses of such DDoS to filter only anomalous (attack) traffic. In identifying the source IP addresses, it arises the other conflict between condition 2) and 3). Today, DDoS attack are caused by botnets, composed with a huge number of compromised hosts. Identifying such number of IP addresses is not only difficult but also useless, because current router cannot be configured for such number of ACLs. Here, it is observed that origin of DDoS traffic is not uniformly distributed in the IP address space, but concentrated on specific Autonomous Systems (ASes), or address ranges [2] . Thus, to reduce the number of ACLs, in spite of identifying each individual source IP address, we should identify the compromised hosts as IP address range (prefixes). By specifying the address with more larger prefix, the number of ACLs decreases, but the collateral filtering may increase. Thus these three conditions are interchangeably in conflicts relationships.
In this paper, we present a method to simultaneously accomplish these requirements, we define a score for a set of address prefixes that represents above three requirements, coverage ratio, collateral ratio, and number of address prefixes. Then, identifying the anomalous traffic results in selecting the IP address prefixes that has highest scores. However, the algorithm that greedy evaluates all possible combination of IP address prefixes to find a set with highest scores requires huge computing resources because the number of possible combination easily increases as the number of prefixes grows. We adopt dynamic programming to decrease the evaluation time. Because the address prefixes can be represented as a tree whose node corresponds to a prefix, we can adopt dynamic programming as evaluating a sub tree and recursively use the result for evaluating larger tree that include the sub tree.
There some works focusing on filtering attack (malicious) traffic by identifying it as source IP address ranges [4, 5] . However, both works do not simultaneously optimize above three conditions. For example, in [4] , number of address ranges is limited (e.g. 20) and in [5] , volume of traffic. Thus, there might be the case where we cannot filter sufficient volume of traffic or number of filter exceeds the limitation of routers.
We evaluate our algorithm by comparing the computing time between greedy method and dynamic programing-based method. We then show an example of an anomaly identification with actual DDoS traffic provided by CAIDA [3] and show that we can identify 92% of anomalous traffic with 2.7% collateral.
In this paper, we propose a method that simultaneously accomplish these requirements, coverage ratio, collateral ratio, and number of address prefixes. To do this, we define a score that reflects the above requirements for each the set of IP address prefixes and identifying the anomalous traffic by selecting the set that has highest scores.
Anomaly traffic identification
In this section, we first formalize the identification of traffic anomaly, and then propose the adoption of dynamic programming. Due to space limitation, we focus on the identifying source IP addresses of anomaly traffic. Other attributes of flows can also be identified with the same way. We independently identify the anomaly traffic on each attribute, then take a product set of each identified set and then evaluate it to judge whether or not the set is to be aggregate flow sets of anomalous traffic.
Formalization
We assume traffic before anomaly as normal traffic and identify the anomalous traffic as the difference before and after the anomaly. We build the IPv4 address binary tree where the root corresponds to 0.0.0.0/0, a leaf corresponds to /32 address and each intermediate node has two child nodes.
Each node n has the coverage and collateral values. • CovðnÞ [bps]: Attack traffic rate to node n that is measured as difference between and after anomaly.
• ColðnÞ [bps]: Legitimate traffic rate to node n that is measured before anomaly.
CovðnÞ and ColðnÞ can be calculated by measuring some periods of traffic (e.g. 5 minutes) before and during the attack and counting bytes for each node (source address) n that appears in the measured traffic. If a node n only appears before (during) the attack, then we set CovðnÞ (ColðnÞ) as zero. Then, we define the following values for a set of nodes S, where each node n 2 S is not ancestor of another node m 2 S.
• CovðSÞ :¼ P n2S CovðnÞ • ColðSÞ :¼ P n2S ColðnÞ • NðSÞ :¼ jSj (Number of nodes in the set)
From the view point of identification, requirements for the identification can be summarized as the following three conditions; 1) covering the anomalous traffic (maximizing the filter coverage), 2) avoiding to cover the normal traffic (minimizing collateral filtering), and 3) with small number of flows (minimizing the number of ACLs). A desirable set is that has higher Cov and smaller Col and n. Thus we define a function that represents desirability of the node set, such as
where α, β, and γ are weighting parameters for corresponding indexes. For each node sets in IP address tree, we evaluate the value fðSÞ, and choose the set of nodeŝ S whose has the highest values asŜ ¼ arg min S fðSÞ 1 . Fig. 1 shows the example. Each node corresponds to an address prefix n, that has CovðnÞ and ColðnÞ. Then we chose a set of nodes S which has the highest fðSÞ. In the figure, blue nodes are chosen as the set with NðSÞ ¼ 4.
Dynamic programming
Though we can obtain address prefix set S which has highest scores by naively evaluates all possible combination of IP address prefixes, it requires huge computing resources because the number of possible combination easily increases as the number of prefixes grows. Here, we adopt dynamic programming to decrease the evaluation time.
Here, if a node set in a sub-tree is selected as a part of best node set in the whole tree, the set must be the best node set in the sub-tree. Note that this fact holds when the objective function f is additive in that fðS [ TÞ ¼ fðSÞ þ fðTÞ for each disjoint node sets S and T. It is easily shown that Eqn. 1 satisfies the condition. In that case, the following equation holds for disjoint node set S, S 0 , and T 2 :
Thus we can start with a smallest sub-tree with two leaf nodes and their parent node, and select a best nodes set among them. Then recursively use the result for evaluating larger tree that include the sub tree.
Step 1: Chose a node n whose child nodes are only leaf node. If such a node does not exist, then algorithm stops and generate the existing nodes as the best node set. Fig. 1 . Address tree 1 Actually, we implement some constraint on Cov, Col, N for practical use such as CovðSÞ < 0:05. However, we focus on the optimization for the sake of simplicity 2 In fact, additive property is sufficient condition but not necessary condition. Therefore, more loose condition can be considered, but in this paper, we limit the function as additive one.
Step 2: Make all combinations of the node n and its child nodes (at most two), say, c and c 0 and possible combinations are fng; fcg; fc 0 g; fc; c 0 g 3 . Chose a combination S who has the highest fðSÞ in Eqn. 1.
Step 3: Replace n with S and consider S as a leaf node. Return to Step 1.
Numerical evaluation
We evaluate our algorithm with actual traffic data.
Performance comparison
Firstly, we compare the computing time for naive method and dynamic programming.
We evaluate our algorithm with the WIDE MAWI traffic data [6] . Number of flow in the data set is 457,716 and the number of unique IP addresses is 61,124. We change the number of nodes and measure the computing time to generate best node set. While the computing time for naive method exponentially increase as the number of node increases, that for dynamic programming remains negligible as in Fig. 2 . Actually, when the address tree is perfect binary, then it is easy to show that the number of evaluation for dynamic programing is linear to the number of leaf nodes. However, because the increase for naive method is so rapid, that for dynamic programing cannot be observed.
Application example
We apply our algorithm to actual DDoS traffic data provided by CAIDA [3] . The data consists of DDoS traffic only, and we combine it with normal traffic data also provided by CAIDA captured at a 10G link. Then, we check how our algorithm extracts the DDoS traffic from combined traffic. In both data, IP addresses are anonymized with prefix preserving way, thus we can evaluate our address prefix based identification even if the addresses are anonymized. Fig. 3 shows the results (The blue nodes are selected nodes with highest score). As described in the previous section, naive search method cannot handle a tree larger than twenty leaf nodes, but by using dynamic programming, we can Actually, we can omit the set which has both child node and parent node, because it means there are two ACLs whose addresses are overlapped each other. successfully analyze large tree which has 52 leaf nodes, and achieves 92.0% of anomalous traffic with 2.7% collateral by selecting 14 address prefix nodes. On the other hand, if we limit the number of leaf node to twenty, then the coverage of best node sets becomes 67.7% and the collateral is 1.2%.
Conclusion
This paper proposes an identification method of anomalous traffic such as DDoS attacks which meets the requirements for the identification can be summarized as the following three conditions; 1) covering the anomalous traffic, 2) avoiding to cover normal traffic, 3) with small number of aggregated flows. We evaluate our algorithm by using actual DDoS traffic data and show that computation time does not exponentially increase as the conventional method does. In addition, we experimentally apply our algorithm to actual DDoS traffic, and achieves 92.0% of anomalous traffic with 2.7% collateral.
